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1. Introduction 
1.1 What is an attitude? 
In a complex world a quick evaluation of objects and situations is very helpful. It can guide 
our attention and behavior toward the things that matter to us. Attitudes are such evalu-
ations. They can refer to anything one can conceive of: individuals and groups, products, 
music, or even smells, as well as suggestions and ideas. For example, when we meet 
someone new, we form an attitude toward our new acquaintance within seconds. Often, we 
do not know where this affective reaction comes from.  
Attitudes can be formed in various ways: Imagine you are browsing the Internet for a holi-
day destination. You will find hundreds of different offers for package tours: how do you 
decide which one to book? You may like the pictures of the sea or of people relaxing in a 
bar. Maybe the web advertisement claims that 89% of costumers were highly satisfied with 
the holiday. Or, if it is very important to you not to spend too much money, you will 
elaborate carefully on which services are included. Eventually, you will come up with a 
summary evaluation regarding which offer is the best, and, if you consider the price to be 
appropriate, perhaps buy it. As this example illustrates, many different aspects can impact 
the evaluation of an object. A spontaneous affective reaction is immediately activated (in 
this case that could be a positive reaction to sunny pictures), heuristic inferences are made, 
for instance, “if 89% were happy it must be quite good”, or very systematic thinking about 
the concrete features of the offer results in a judgment of whether this holiday suits you or 
not (see Erb, et al., 1998, expt. 2). 
1.2 How to measure attitudes? 
Social psychologists invented a large range of measurement paradigms that tap into differ-
ent aspects of attitudes and attitude change. The simplest way to assess an attitude is to just 
ask people how they like something, on a scale, for instance, from “not at all” (1) to (7) “def-
initely like it,” or to ask whether or not they agree with statements in favor or disfavor of the 
attitude object (Likert scale; Likert, 1932). Those are examples of self-report measures of atti-
tudes that will be referred to as explicit attitudes in this chapter. When attitudes are meas-
ured by asking people explicitly how the object of interest is liked, respondents are usually 
able to answer this question. However, the outcome is also subject to impression manage-
ment and may not cover all aspects like spontaneous affective reactions. To eliminate effects 
of social desirability on attitude measures social psychologist developed several "tricks". 
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They used feigned lie detectors (bogus pipeline, Jones & Sigall, 1971), word fragment 
completion tests (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991), and numerous other paradigms.  
A relatively new class of attitude measures concentrates on reaction time effects of attitude 
stimuli. In a nutshell, attitudes are inferred from effects of interference or facilitation on very 
fast evaluative responses. These paradigms allow to measure spontaneous, difficult-to-con-
trol reactions that will be referred to as implicit attitudes in this chapter. Two paradigms 
have been predominantly applied: the implicit association test (IAT, Greenwald, et al., 1998) 
and the evaluative priming task (Fazio, et al., 1995; for a review see De Houwer, et al., 2009). 
When answering an IAT, participants classify stimuli via key-presses with respect to a target 
category or to their valence. Two sorts of experimental blocks are conducted with several tri-
als each: in a "compatible" block, the target categories and positive or negative answers 
share response keys according to their presumed association. For example, participants 
press the left key for insects or negative stimuli, and the right key for flowers or positive 
stimuli. In an "incompatible" block, one of the key-assignments is reversed (insects or posit-
ive – left; flowers or negative – right). Differences in response times between the two blocks 
(incompatible minus compatible) indicate the difference in implicit attitudes toward the two 
concepts. More positive implicit attitudes toward flowers (versus insects) result in shorter 
reaction times in the compatible block and longer ones in the incompatible block, thus res-
ulting in a positive difference. For more information about implicit measures of attitudes we 
refer the reader to other volumes (see e.g. De Houwer et al. 2009; Gawronski & Payne, 2010), 
as a full discussion would exceed the range of this chapter.  
In sum, we have seen that attitudes can be measured in different ways. Attitudes have con-
sequences on how we think and act (Allport, 1935). Thus, measuring different aspects of atti-
tudes can help to predict how people eventually act. The prediction of both spontaneous 
and deliberate aspects of behavior may improve when applying both implicit and explicit 
measures of attitude (Friese, Hofman, & Wänke, 2008). 
2. Attitudes and attitude change 
As in other fields of social cognition, the notion of automaticity was central to attitude re-
search within the last two decades (Bargh, 2007). Although implicit measures are probably 
not the "bona fide pipeline" (Fazio, et al., 1995) to attitudes, they do provide the means to 
investigate automatic evaluative responses that are often not easily accessible to 
introspection – and therefore cannot be easily reported in questionnaires. A great number of 
studies employing several variants of implicit measures of attitudes aimed to disentangle 
the processes underlying spontaneous attitude formation and change (e.g. Conrey, et al., 
2005). Concerns, with respect to internal and construct validity of implicit measures have 
been extensively discussed (e.g. Rothermund & Wentura, 2004; Moors & De Houwer, 2006). 
Meta-analysis suggests that implicit and explicit attitudes are generally related, but higher 
levels of elaboration can reduce correlations (see Hofmann, et al., 2005). For the purposes of 
this chapter we will assume that implicit measures tap more or less into spontaneous 
affective reactions, while explicit measures reflect more effortful thinking including self-
presentational issues.  
Several models have been proposed to integrate results from implicit and explicit measures, 
including the meta-cognitive model (Petty, et al., 2007) and the reflective-impulsive model 
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(Strack & Deutsch, 2004). We will concentrate here on one of the most influential models, the 
associative-propositional evaluations model (APE model, Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 
2006a).  
2.1 Explicit attitude change: How many routes to persuasion? 
An early explanation for attitude change was cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957). 
Cognitive dissonance emerges when interrelated cognitions contradict each other. For ex-
ample, if I drink a coffee with my colleagues after every lunch although I do not like coffee 
in general, this would give rise to dissonant feelings about coffee. On the one hand, I don't 
like the taste, but on the other hand, I drank it, so I must like it (Bem, 1972). When 
individuals have a reason to which they can attribute their behavior, this reason can be 
added as dissonance-reducing cognition and no attitude change is necessary. In the coffee 
example, such additional cognitions could be "it's nice and sociable to have a coffee 
together" or "drinking a coffee makes me alert enough to concentrate on my work". When no 
external justification and no other way to resolve dissonance can be found, attitudes are 
often changed to regain cognitive consistency. In this example, the attitude toward coffee 
would become more positive. This effect was shown with participants who were asked to 
tell another participant that a boring experiment they had just attended was in fact exciting 
(Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). They were either paid 1 $ or 20 $ for lying. The group who 
received the large amount of money did not change their attitude toward the experiment, 
whereas the group who received only 1 $ liked the experiment more. Here, the relatively 
large amount of money served as external justification for the positive statement about the 
experiment. If only little money was received this was not sufficient to resolve dissonance, 
so attitudes were changed. 
Dual-process models of persuasion – the elaboration likelihood model (ELM, Petty & Ca-
cioppo, 1986) and the heuristic-systematic model (HSM, Chaiken, 1987) – emphasize that at-
titude change can be due to low-effort or high-effort processing, termed peripheral and cent-
ral route in the ELM and heuristic and systematic processing in the HSM. Which processing 
style occurs depends on a person's current motivation to hold a correct attitude and limits to 
processing capacity. Low motivation or scarce capacity will result in peripheral/heuristic 
processing, whereas high motivation and ample capacity lead to central/systematic pro-
cessing of the arguments. The ELM emphasizes that any variable in the persuasive setting 
can function in “multiple roles” (Petty & Wegener, 1998). Take, for example, the 
presentation of a car by an attractive model: People may either process effortlessly, 
misattributing the positive affect elicited by the model to the car, or they may apply more 
processing effort, thus realizing that the attractiveness of the model does not say anything 
about the quality of the car. Moreover, the attractiveness of the model could also trigger 
motivation to associate oneself with her by liking the car she drives and thus motivation to 
find reasons to like the car by increased central processing. The ELM also predicts that the 
amount of central processing an individual engages in is positively related to the strength of 
resulting attitudes (Petty, et al., 1995). 
The HSM assumes that both heuristic and systematic processing may serve multiple 
motives: accuracy, impression, and defense motivation. Accuracy-motivated individuals 
strive to hold correct attitudes, thus systematic processing is increased. When the 
impression motive is high, social needs will be served through expressing socially 
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acceptable views; thus, impression-motivated processors will need to determine which 
attitude is most socially desired. Defense-motivated processing tends to confirm a person's 
self-relevant views and to avoid or reject opposing views. The HSM also features 
hypotheses about the co-occurrence and interplay of heuristic and systematic processing 
(Bohner, et al., 1995; Chaiken, et al., 1989): The bias hypothesis predicts that heuristics may 
lead to systematic processing in line with the valence of a heuristic cue. For instance, 
Chaiken and Maheswaran (1994) found that, under conditions of high task-importance, 
systematic elaboration of ambiguous arguments was biased by source credibility cues. Thus, 
readers' evaluation of a fictitious answering machine was more positive when ambiguous 
reasons to buy came from an independent test magazine rather than when the same 
arguments were stated in a retail chain's advert. Evaluative judgments were mediated by 
the valence of listed thoughts, indicating that systematic processes were indeed biased by 
cue information. A mirror-image of the bias hypothesis is the contrast hypothesis, which 
assumes that source cues can bias message processing in a direction opposite to the 
evaluative implications of cue valence. This effect was shown with expert and lay 
communicators giving strong versus weak arguments on a tunnel project (Bohner, et al., 
2002). When experts promoted the tunnel with only weak arguments, participants’ attitudes 
were less favorable than when the same weak arguments came from a lay person. 
Conversely, strong arguments presented by a lay person (vs. an expert) tended to be more 
persuasive. Presumably, when argument quality violates expectancies derived from source 
information, the result is a contrasting evaluation of the topic.   
Despite their ability to predict attitude change in persuasion research, dual-process models 
of persuasion were challenged by the unimodel (Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999). The 
unimodel claimed that differential effects for cue versus message processing were due not to 
qualitatively distinct processes but rather to the different nature of the information. In typical 
persuasion experiments, cues were relatively short and easy to process, whereas arguments 
typically consisted of longer texts that consume more effort and time to read. Therefore, 
unsurprisingly, it takes more effort to process lengthy message arguments than, for instance, 
a short sentence about source expertise. Moreover, in research on dual-process models, 
persuasion cues were typically presented at the beginning, and arguments followed later. 
Kruglanski and Thompson (1999) argue that all processing of attitude-relevant information 
could be conceptualized better via a single underlying mechanism of syllogistic reasoning: 
When a recipient reads a persuasive message, she will compare the information with 
available relevant knowledge. For instance, if an expert from a renowned ‘Institute for 
Natural Energy Resources’ claims that oil is becoming scarce, every part of the sentence will 
run through a check-up with relevant knowledge. A major premise (i.e. prior knowledge) in 
this case may be “experts know a lot about their field and are usually right”, and the minor 
premise taken from the persuasive information could be “this is an expert on the topic”, and 
the conclusion will then be “… so she is probably right, and oil is indeed becoming scarce”. 
Similar inferences can be made about specific arguments of the message. In this case, one of 
the arguments could be that oil prices are constantly rising, which can be related to know-
ledge about price increases following the scarcity of a product. The unimodel postulates that 
some parts of information may be processed relatively easily, whereas some inferences may 
require relatively large amounts of effortful thinking. How much effort is put into pro-
cessing of a persuasive message is determined by motivation and capacity to process. If mo-
tivation or capacity to process is low, elaboration will end relatively early. Consequently, in-
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formation that is presented first – like cue-information in studies on dual-processes in per-
suasion – will affect the evaluative judgment more strongly than identical information that 
is presented later. In sum, the unimodel does account for evidence that had been interpreted 
in terms of dual-process models; moreover, it explains additional effects of order of 
presentation (see e.g. Erb, et al., 2007), which dual-process models could not easily explain. 
As models of persuasion were primarily concerned with the explanation of effects on expli-
cit evaluative judgments, they cannot be directly applied to findings from studies 
employing implicit measures of attitudes (but see Petty & Wegener, 1998). The next section 
will introduce a model that integrates findings from explicit and implicit attitudes. 
2.2 Integration of implicit attitudes and explicit attitude change 
Based on a constructionist concept of attitudes (Schwarz & Bohner, 2001; see also Bohner & 
Dickel, 2011), the APE model (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006a) discusses the interplay 
between changes on implicit and explicit measures. It proposes two general, distinct 
processes of attitude change: associative change, i.e. change in the automatic activation of 
cognitions associated with an attitude object, which is largely reflected in changes on 
implicit measures, and propositional change, which is characterized by the process of 
consciously ascribing a truth value to a thought about an object; the latter is captured mostly 
by explicit attitude measures.  
Associative structure is modeled based on connectionist theory (for connectionist conceptu-
alizations of attitudes see Conrey & Smith, 2007; Monroe & Read, 2008; Smith, 1996). "Con-
nectionism is an approach to cognitive modeling that uses linked networks of concepts to 
represent cognitive structures. In these networks, activation flows between nodes and 
changes the activation of individual cognitions" (Monroe & Read, 2008, p. 735). The APE 
model assumes that associative change – as captured by implicit attitudes – relies either on 
changes in the associative structure or on changes in the activation pattern of associations. 
When a stimulus is perceived, associated cognitions are activated automatically, irrespective 
of the personal approval of an association. According to the APE model, the prototypical 
case of change in associative structure is evaluative conditioning, a procedure by which an 
originally neutral stimulus acquires valence when perceived together with a positive or neg-
ative stimulus. For example, in a study on evaluative conditioning with children, unknown 
cartoon characters were repeatedly presented paired either with ice cream or with Brussels 
sprouts (Field, 2006). Afterwards, the children liked the characters more when they had 
been presented together with ice-cream than when they had been presented with Brussels 
sprouts. The APE model assumes that procedures like this change the associative structures 
and therefore produce change on implicit attitudes. Associative change can also occur due 
to changes in pattern activation, this means, accessible parts of the associative structure are 
activated situationally. For illustration, consider a consumer who usually buys the same 
brand of a chocolate bar, because he likes the sweetness, color of packaging, texture, etc. 
When he is on holiday he might associate completely different aspects related to chocolate 
than usual, which have become more accessible through the unfamiliar situation. For 
instance, when it is hot, chocolate might be considered to melt easily, or different product 
alternatives might be available. Depending on the context – home versus holiday – different 
aspects are highly accessible: at home the usual association of the bar as being smooth and 
sweet is likely to be activated, whereas on holiday, when it is hot, the sticky aspect of melt-
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ing chocolate might take priority. After all, our consumer will perhaps buy some olives 
instead. Hence, different contexts can render certain aspects accessible, i.e. the pattern of 
activation can differ depending on the context. A research example for context-effects on 
implicit attitudes is an IAT-study by Foroni and Mayr (2005), who showed a reversed 
pattern of liking for insects and flowers after participants imagined a fictional post-nuclear 
war scenario, where insects were the only healthy nutrition and flowers were contaminated 
(for more evidence of context-sensitivity of implicit attitudes see e.g. Barden, Maddux, Petty 
& Brewer, 2004). The APE model emphasizes that associations are activated automatically 
independent of personal approval. 
In contrast, propositional change of attitudes, according to the APE model, is based on careful 
thinking about a topic. Every thought is given a positive or negative truth value. Con-
sequently, the set of considered propositions can be consistent or inconsistent. Evaluative 
implications of automatic associations are set into proportion to propositions and will be 
either approved or rejected. The amount of propositions that is generated or considered is 
determined by motivation and opportunity to process. Longer engagement in propositional 
evaluation will result in more propositions, which, in turn, increases the likelihood of imbal-
ance within the set of propositions. In our example on oil prices, additional thoughts like 
“distributors may have deliberately flowed less oil to increase prices” could weaken our 
earlier reasoning that rising oil prices allude to significant scarcity of natural oil resources, 
and would call into question the expertise of the communicator and her statement. These 
new propositions are added to the set of considered propositions and might result a higher 
degree of inconsistency. Individuals can adopt several strategies to reconcile inconsistent 
propositions (see Festinger, 1957). Inconsistency can be resolved either by rejecting an 
inconsistent proposition as false or by finding new propositions that resolve the 
inconsistency. Only the first strategy will result in explicit attitude change. 
According to the APE model, attitude change can occur independently via both processes, 
and one process can also be mediated through the other, respectively. However, the default 
case is approval of the associative evaluation, as individuals usually invest as little cognitive 
effort as possible (see also the "cognitive miser", Fiske & Taylor, 1991). If motivational 
factors lead to further elaboration, automatic evaluations can be rejected, or systematic 
thinking can bring propositions to mind that reflect on associative structure, for instance 
with the activation of incidents like the crash of the oil rig “deepwater horizon”, which was 
associated with destruction of nature, thus presumably activating negative associations. 
The assumption that processes of implicit and explicit change differ qualitatively from each 
other has been questioned (Kruglanski & Dechesne, 2006) – a discussion resembling that 
between dual-process models and the unimodel in persuasion research. In particular, the 
view that activation of an association is independent of assigning a truth value to it, and that 
evaluative conditioning is a paradigmatic case of associative change has been much debated 
(Kruglanski & Dechesne, 2006; Mitchell, et al., 2009). Against the view that the activation of 
associations can be thought of as rule-based (“if … then rules” like in the unimodel, 
Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999), Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006b) hold that associative 
pattern activation may well follow rules, but these do not have to be consciously 
represented by individuals; instead, they can be inferred by researchers observing 
behavioral data. With respect to evaluative conditioning, a recent approach postulates a 
merely propositional process to underlie evaluative conditioning (De Houwer, 2009). 
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Despite these controversies, for our analysis it seems crucial that implicit measures of 
attitude capture very quick reactions that reflect more difficult-to-control affective reactions 
to an object (Hofmann, Friese, & Strack, 2009), whereas explicit measures of attitude capture 
more reflective, controlled evaluations (see also Strack & Deutsch, 2004).  
Having introduced major theories of attitude concepts and attitude change in general, we 
will now turn to a highly interesting special case of attitude change – social influence on atti-
tudes exerted by minorities and majorities. On the one hand, it will be very helpful to have 
theories of attitude change as a background for analyzing effects of minority and majority 
communication. On the other hand, sometimes paradoxical findings in minority and major-
ity influence research provide the chance to test the applicability and limits of recent 
attitude change theories. In the last part of the chapter this discussion will converge into a 
new model of consensus effects. 
3. Minority and majority influence 
Although the origins of majority and minority influence research started with the investiga-
tion of the malleability of perceptual judgments, most studies conducted since the late 1980s 
have concentrated on how attitudes are influenced by minority and majority sources. We 
will nevertheless start with a short discussion in honor of the seminal works by Solomon 
Asch (1952, 1956) and Serge Moscovici and his colleagues (1969, 1980), because most studies 
still refer to the methods and assumptions introduced by them. 
3.1 The roots of social influence research: Conformity and nonconformity in 
perceptual judgments 
3.1.1 Nothing but conformity? 
Under the impression of the Holocaust, social psychology used to focus very much on ef-
fects of group pressure. Solomon Asch asked whether we may "simply conclude that 
[groups] can induce persons to shift their decisions and convictions in almost any desired 
direction [...]” (Asch, 1956, p. 2). In his seminal studies on conformity (1956, Exp. 1) he in-
vestigated whether even simple perceptual judgments could be affected by a contradictory 
majority claim. A confederate majority of eight students and a minority of one participant 
engaged in a line judgment task that compared the length of a standard line to a set of three 
comparison lines. The line of equal length should be identified and stated out loud. In critic-
al trials, the majority unanimously gave an evidently wrong answer. Compared to a control 
condition, where participants and confederates wrote down their answers silently, the likeli-
hood of wrong answers in critical trials increased dramatically when participants answered 
in public.  
Asch’s work started up a whole field of research in social psychology. Many studies invest-
igated the circumstances that cause conformity and the processes that underlie conforming 
behavior. A meta-analysis conducted on 133 studies that employed the line judgment task 
(Bond & Smith, 1996) showed conformity to be stronger in collectivist countries than in indi-
vidualist countries. Other moderators of conformist behavior were (a) type of stimulus ma-
terial: the more ambiguous the material the greater the influence by the majority (e.g. 
Crutchfield, 1955), (b) out-group versus in-group status: out-group majorities had signific-
www.intechopen.com
 
Psychology – Selected Papers 
 
256 
antly less influence than in-group majorities (e.g. Abrams, et al., 1990), and (c) the propor-
tion of female respondents: a larger proportion of females in the sample increased the size of 
the majority effect (see Bond & Smith, 1996, p. 120). 
In summary, although at least half of Asch’s sample can also be said to have acted sensibly 
by just occasionally giving in to signal their willingness to cooperate with the majority (see 
Hodges & Geyer, 2006), most researchers in the 1950s to 1970s including Asch himself saw 
overwhelming evidence for non-rational conformist behavior (Milgram, Bickman, & 
Berkowitz, 1969; for a review see Cialdini & Trost, 1998). This prevailing perspective pro-
voked Moscovici and his colleagues to challenge the one-way reasoning on social influence 
processes by investigating how minorities can exert influence on majority members. 
3.1.2 The rehabilitation of the minority 
If conformity were the dominant principle in groups and societies, a complete synchroniza-
tion of thoughts, actions and attitudes would result, and no societal change would ever hap-
pen. Thus, new ideas that are usually supported by minorities at the beginning would never 
succeed. However, there are numerous examples from history that social change is possible, 
and hence minorities do exert some influence. A very successful social movement that was 
supported by a minority of people at the beginning was, for example, the environmental 
movement. Thirty years ago the use of recycling paper and saving energy was rather exotic, 
but today has become rather common. 
Moscovici and his colleagues wanted to find experimental evidence that minorities also 
could exert substantial influence on majority members’ judgments. For this purpose, a per-
ception task was used (Moscovici & Personnaz, 1980): Predominantly blue slides with little 
proportions of green were projected on a white wall. A confederate and a participant were 
asked to publicly name the color of the slides and then, in private, to name the color of the 
afterimage that appeared on the white background after the stimulus had disappeared. Due 
to features of human vision, the color of this afterimage is complementary to the originally 
perceived color. The confederate answers (always “green”) were allegedly either associated 
with a minority of 18% or with a majority of 82% from earlier experimental trials. As a 
result, public responses on the color of the slide did not differ between the minority and 
majority condition. However, color judgments of the afterimage given in private tended to 
be closer to the afterimage of green in the minority condition than in the majority condition 
(Moscovici & Personnaz, 1980). Studies on the afterimage effect constituted the core 
endorsement of Moscovici’s conversion theory (1980), which assumes that minority and 
majority influence engender two different processes: individuals confronted with a majority 
engage in a comparison process, which compares their own tendency to answer with the 
majority’s response, but do not consider in detail the reasons behind the majority statement. 
The detection of differences between one’s own answer and the predominant answer results 
in public compliance, but not in private change. Minority positions, in contrast, due to their 
distinctiveness, set off a validation process that strives to understand why the minority's 
response is different. Minorities, thus, can cause private change that is usually not stated 
publicly, as people do not want to be associated with a minority (see Mugny, 1982).  
The afterimage studies and conversion theory have been most influential in social influence 
research and induced several research projects on the impact of minorities (e.g. Mugny, 
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1982; Nemeth, 1986). However, despite its large influence, the original studies turned out to 
be difficult to replicate (see Wood et al., 1994, who found authorship effects with higher 
levels of indirect minority influence for studies conducted by Moscovici or his students as 
compared to other research groups, p. 335). Several criticisms concerning the methodology 
of the after-image studies lead to rejection of the evidence from the afterimage paradigm 
(see Martin & Hewstone, 2001). Still, – much like conversion theory itself assumes – the af-
terimage studies and their precursors, initially being a minority position in the scientific 
field, directed attention toward the impact of minorities and have stimulated a lot of re-
search, of which a selection will be reviewed in the next section. 
3.2 How many routes to minority and majority effects on explicit attitudes? 
Much like in persuasion research generally, there are two lines of modeling processes of 
minority and majority influence. On the one hand, approaches based on Moscovici’s 
conversion theory assume two distinct cognitive processes underlying minority and 
majority influence (e.g. Crano & Alvaro, 1998; Nemeth, 1986). While minorities urge people 
to think carefully about the positions and agree rather privately than in public, majorities 
cause public conformity without much systematic thinking. On the other hand, some 
models posit the same underlying process for minority and majority influence, with power 
of influence proportionate to the level of support (e.g. Doms & van Avermaat, 1983; 
Kruglanski & Mackie, 1990). Although the implementation of paradigms from persuasion 
studies in minority and majority influence research (e.g. Baker & Petty, 1994; Erb et al., 1998; 
Maass & Clark, 1983; see also Bohner, et al., 1995) allowed for a more direct assessment of 
the amount of processing that was triggered by each source, as we will see, the findings are 
mixed (see Wood et al., 1994). This is mainly due to different experimental designs and 
operationalizations, which will be discussed.  
3.2.1 Dual-process accounts 
Most of the dual-process models of minority and majority influence assume that minorities 
– due to their distinctiveness – attract larger amounts of attention toward their positions 
(Moscovici, 1980; Nemeth, 1986). If not derogated per se, e.g. because the minority belongs 
to an out-group (Mugny, 1982), minority statements will be elaborated more intensely than 
majority issues (Crano & Alvaro, 1998). More intense elaboration of strong arguments 
should result in greater change, especially when no prior judgment has to be defended 
(Crano & Hannula-Bral, 1994; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). This change, however, is often not 
expressed as people often do not want to be associated with a minority. Change on the focal 
judgment can also be blocked and transferred to indirectly related judgments. In a series of 
studies, Crano and his colleagues (Alvaro & Crano, 1997; Crano & Alvaro, 1998) employed 
an indirect measure of minority and majority influence. Attitude change following in-group 
minority communication emerged on topics that were only indirectly related to the focus of 
persuasion, with the participants being unaware of this relation (cf. Mackie, 1987, who 
found change on related topics following both minority and majority communication). 
Since the formulation of dual-process models of persuasion, pronounced parallels to social 
influence research have become evident (Bohner, et al., 1995; Maass & Clark, 1983; Nemeth, 
1986). Both systematic processing (HSM) and the central route to persuasion (ELM) com-
prise careful scrutiny of available information, which can be seen as similar to the presumed 
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validation process triggered by minority communication. Also, low effort processing 
modeled by HSM and ELM are comparable to low-effort compliance to majority statements. 
Thus, minority and majority influence research could benefit from methodological advance-
ments, such as systematic variations of argument quality, to investigate more directly the 
processes at play.  
In an experiment using a thought listing technique, Maass and Clark (1983) assessed which 
kind of processing route (in terms of the ELM) participants would engage in after minority 
and majority communication. Following simultaneous exposure to minority and majority 
argumentation on gay rights (with positions counterbalanced across experimental groups), 
participants completed a questionnaire either in private or in the expectation that it would 
be presented publicly to a discussion group. Much in line with conversion theory, attitudes 
moved toward the majority if expressed publicly and toward the minority if recorded 
privately (exp. 1 and 2). Thought listings on the topics showed – interestingly – the same 
level of cognitive activation (i.e. number of thoughts) for both minority and majority 
sources. As predicted by conversion theory along with the ELM, persistent attitude change 
was mediated by level of cognitive activity (central route processing), but compliance was 
not (expt. 2). 
Inspired by the HSM (Chaiken, 1987; Chaiken, et al., 1989) and attribution theory (Kelley, 
1967, 1973), Bohner, et al. (1996) conducted a study which addressed the role of 
distinctiveness information in minority and majority influence. Conversion theory 
(Moscovici, 1980) promotes distinctiveness – besides consistency – as one of the central 
factors that exclusively increase minority persuasion because it attracts attention to the issue 
and the minority's position, which should be scrutinized more systematically as a 
consequence. However, distinctiveness in terms of conversion theory (Moscovici, 1980) 
differs substantially from distinctiveness as employed by attribution theory (Kelley, 1967): 
Moscovici concentrates on the salience of the minority members, whereas Kelley focuses on 
which opinion is salient. The framework of the covariation model, hence, predicts high 
levels of persuasion when distinctiveness, consistency, and consensus are high. Under these 
conditions high levels of persuasion are mediated by entity attributions (to the facts 
concerning the persuasive topic). Predictions by attribution theory were supported, showing 
a disadvantage for minority (as compared to majority) persuasion if distinctiveness and 
consistency are constant for both conditions. Ironically, Moscovici was right to identify 
distinctiveness and consistency as powerful mediators of persuasion, although, this applies 
to both minority and majority sources. However, these results do not speak to the question 
of whether high levels of distinctiveness lead to more systematic processing. This was 
further clarified by another experiment (Bohner, Frank & Erb, 1998) which found 
independent main effects of argument strength and distinctiveness, indicating that 
distinctiveness in itself did not affect the level of systematic processing.  
Evidence by Nemeth and colleagues suggests that it is rather the type of thinking than the 
amount of attention which is guided by consensus information (Nemeth, 1986). In a figure-
comparison task where all patterns that contained a standard figure should be identified, 
participants found more alternative solutions after they had seen a minority (rather than a 
majority) member find a solution that differed from the most obvious solution (Nemeth & 
Wachtler, 1983). Thus, following minority influence participants found more alternative 
solutions, which Nemeth (1986) interpreted as due to a divergent thinking style, whereas 
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majority influence prompted mere reproduction of the demonstrated solution, which Ne-
meth interpreted as due to convergent thinking. Further results indicating divergent thinking 
following dissent were found with other dependent variables like word-associations 
(Nemeth & Kwan, 1985) and free recall (Nemeth, et al., 1990). Evidence for divergent think-
ing was also found by Erb and colleagues (1998), who analyzed the content of thought list-
ings following minority communication in a persuasion paradigm: Independent of valence, 
consensus information predicted the novelty of thoughts. Nemeth (1986) attributed the 
larger creativity to the fact that being confronted with a minority is generally less stressful 
than being confronted with a majority. Moreover, when levels of stress are high, more 
attention is driven to the central task, peripheral aspects are neglected. Thus, the lower 
levels of stress experienced when confronted with a minority widens the focus and allows 
for more creative solutions (see also Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006a, p. 700). According to 
the mere consensus approach, a more general explanation for increased levels of divergence 
following minority communication may be priming unusualness. Minorities – due to their 
inherent property of being unusual – will make more creative solutions more accessible. 
In summary, the adoption of persuasion paradigms by social influence studies has ruled out 
largely the assumption of high- versus low-effort processing as attached to minority and 
majority communication. Rather, minority sources (as compared to majority sources) elicit a 
different focus of thinking: Minority communication seems to widen the focus of the ad-
dressee whereas majority communication narrows the focus. Alternatives to social influence 
models that assume two different modes of processing have proposed a single modus at op-
eration irrespective of the minority versus majority status of the communicator.  
3.2.2 Single-process accounts 
Single process accounts assume a general influence process for both minority and majority 
sources (Doms & van Avermaet, 1980; Latané & Wolf, 1981; Tanford & Penrod, 1984). With 
their social impact model, Latané and Wolf (1981) criticized that minority and majority influ-
ence could not be compared validly in many studies to that date, because the direction of in-
fluence was either from an active majority to a passive minority or vice versa and was often 
confounded with power of the source. They proposed that the influence of both sources 
should instead be studied simultaneously and be defined merely by their numerical differ-
ences. As a result, consensus is disentangled from power and other factors that may affect 
level of influence. The remaining difference in support for a topic can be estimated as a func-
tion of numerical group size. Hence, a unitary influence by majorities as well as minorities is 
predicted by three factors: strength, closeness, and size of a group (Latané & Wolf, 1981). A 
study on social impact in electronic groups (Latané & L’Herrou, 1996), investigated how 
spatial relations between people affect the spread of influence and maintenance of diversity. It 
showed that complex geometries (with clustering in families, etc.) and boundaries to 
communications (like rivers, walls etc.) promote influence by minorities, whereas open social 
networks without spatial boundaries foster larger majority influence. 
In her studies, Mackie (1987) specifically questions the core assumption of most dual-pro-
cess accounts, that majority sources elicit less elaboration of the topic than minority sources 
do. She argues that high consensus usually indicates correctness, and hence, if it differs from 
one's own position it is worth spending some thought on the majority’s statement (see also 
Bohner, et al., 1998). She had participants listen to tape-recorded discussions with 
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arguments for both sides. Arguments were counterbalancedly attributed to either a minority 
or a majority; consequently participants were exposed to minority and majority position 
simultaneously (exp. 1 and 2). Attitudes toward the topic were assessed privately both 
before and after the message and again with a week's delay. In addition to the focal attitude, 
related topics were tested. Those participants who had been opposed to the majority’s 
opinion significantly changed their mind in the direction of the majority position, whereas 
all others did not. Majority-induced attitude change generalized to related topics. Also, the 
recall and amount of elaboration of arguments predicted immediate attitude change. Thus, 
participants did process systematically what the majority said. In a similar vein, Baker and 
Petty (1994, Expt. 2) found that both processing of minority positions and of majority 
positions can be enhanced when their arguments contradict source-related expectations. 
That is, majorities that claimed positions opposed to prior attitudes held by participants as 
well as minorities stating the participant's position were surprising and thus gave rise to 
scrutinity. 
In response to this challenge to dual-process explanations, it could be argued that single-
process approaches did not include measures of latent influence that should emerge primar-
ily following minority positions, and therefore the differential impact of minorities (com-
pared with majorities) could not be detected (Maass & Clark, 1984; Nemeth, 1986). Some 
studies (e.g. Mackie, 1987) considered this aspect by including measures of indirect attitude 
change, but still did not confirm a duality of processes.  
3.2.3 Discussion of both approaches 
Kruglanski and Mackie (1990) offered a framework for examination of whether minority 
and majority influence are driven by distinct processes or rely on the same principles. 
According to their analysis, strongest evidence for process distinctiveness would be given if 
a factor affected minority influence in a different way than majority influence. For example, 
if high behavioral distinctiveness increased only minority influence but decreased majority 
influence, two different mediating processes could be assumed. As we have seen, however, 
distinctiveness does not moderate minority versus majority influence (Bohner et al., 1996; 
Bohner et al. 1998). Factors that necessarily covary with relative source size and mediate the 
persuasive outcome would also support the duality assumption. In their review, Kruglanski 
and Mackie (1990) identified only one variable that is necessarily tied to consensus 
information, namely the applicability of the consensus heuristic (“majorities are usually 
right”). No other strong cases for process distinctiveness were observed. However, even in 
cases when source impact moderates the outcome, it is not compulsory to assume two 
processes at operation (see also Kruglansi & Thompson, 1999, and Miller & Pederson, 1999).  
In their meta-analysis, Wood and her colleagues (1994) found mainly quantitative differ-
ences between minority and majority influence. Solely for studies with perceptual measures 
of social influence, a superior minority influence could be shown. However, as mentioned 
above, due to their methodological flaws these studies should not be counted as evidence 
for duality of processes in minority and majority influence. A large variety of experimental 
designs makes direct comparison between studies on minority and majority influence diffi-
cult. Minority and majority status was sometimes implemented in combination with power 
(Mugny, 1982), prior attitudes were either moderate or opposed to the persuasive message 
(e.g. Mackie, 1987), sources had in- or out-group status (David & Turner, 1999), and other 
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factors were varied (see Wood et al, 1994). At the same time various operationalizations 
were used, including fictitious (Erb et al., 1998) versus real topics (Maass & Clark, 1983; Al-
varo & Crano, 1997), or real groups (Moscovici, et al., 1969) versus reported poll results 
(Thoben & Erb, 2010). These diverse paradigms complicate a generalization of findings 
across studies.  
However, with their mere consensus approach, Erb and Bohner (2001, 2010) propose to 
study minority and majority influence detached from all other factors. They argue that “… 
even if messages are not discrepant and influence groups are not socially relevant to indi-
viduals, consensus can have profound effects on message-related processing and 
subsequent attitude judgments” (2001, p. 43). Responses to high consensus are predicted to 
be usually more positive than responses to low consensus. This initial evaluative response is 
said to bias processing of the message. Message processing might also be biased with regard 
to novelty of thoughts. With messages that comprise several intermediate arguments and 
few weak and strong arguments, and thus vary argument quality within participants, the 
biasing effect of consensus information on message processing can be detected more 
sensitively (mixed-message method, Erb, et al., 2005). Erb and colleagues (1998) report 
biasing consensus effects even with a pure numerical definition of minorities and majorities, 
and with fictitious topics where no prior attitudes exist. Majorities do evoke more positive 
evaluations of attitude objects and cognitive responses. Consequently, consensus in and of 
itself has a profound influence on social judgments, independent of conflict, power, or prior 
attitudes.  
Of all things, distinctiveness and consistency do not seem to enhance minority influence ex-
clusively (Moscovici, 1980); instead, these factors generalize to majority influence as well 
(Bohner, et al., 1996; see also Doms & VanAvermaet, 1980). Still, there are factors that seem 
to moderate whether minority or majority influence prevails: opinion discrepancy (Baker & 
Petty, 1994; Erb, et al., 2002), in-group versus out-group status (Crano & Alvaro, 1998), need 
for uniqueness (Imhoff & Erb, 2009), risk priming (Erb, et al., 2009), and motivational states 
(Bohner, et al., 2008). According to our analysis, these moderating effects of motivation and 
context are rather due to activation of different aspects that are associated with minorities 
and majorities than to distinct underlying processes. This idea will be discussed in the re-
maining sections. 
4. Automatic to systematic consensus influence (ASCI) model 
With our model of minority and majority influence on implicit and explicit attitudes we ar-
gue that introducing automatic processes to minority and majority influence can open a new 
perspective to the field and generate new predictions. Drawing on the associative and pro-
positional evaluations (APE) model (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006a) and on assump-
tions about the impact of motivational states on systematic processing, as proposed in the 
heuristic-systematic model (e.g. Bohner, et al., 1995), we assume that evaluation of minority 
and majority positions is shaped by the context of presentation and inner motivational and 
emotional states (see also Kruglanski & Mackie, 1990), at both an implicit and explicit level 
of information processing. 
Figure 1 depicts a schematic illustration of the ASCI model. We will elucidate from the per-
spective of the ASCI model how information from persuasive settings with minority or ma-
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jority sources is processed. The level of explicitness is conceptualized as continuous rather 
than dichotomous, ranging from very fast, spontaneous (or automatic) reactions over the ef-
fortless application of heuristics to any desired level of effortful thinking ('continuum of ex-
plicitness' in Figure 1). When a perceiver first sees the text with a minority or majority cue 
and the persuasive message, external input and internal states determine automatic activa-
tion of concepts related to the text. External input could be consensus information, message 
content, the way and the situation in which the text is presented, etc. Internal states can 
facilitate processing of matching external input as well as activate concepts from memory. 
For instance, the need to affiliate with others is likely to render majority sources more 
positive as they provide a larger basis of social support. Other motivational states include 
the need to be accurate or for a positive self-concept. Automatically activated concepts 
related to majorities could be: 'safe', 'correct', 'boring', or even 'repressive', etc. For 
minorities, concepts like 'rare', 'deviant', 'alternative', or 'risky' might be activated. The 
affective component of automatic associations is assessed via implicit measures of attitude. 
 
Fig. 1. Motivational states and external context determine automatic associations, simple 
heuristics and systematic thought about consensus information and persuasive content. 
When the level of elaboration increases, simple propositions or heuristics are built upon the 
activated associations. When motivation to process is high enough, more complex inferences 
about the relation of consensus information, message content, and other relevant evidence 
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will be built. At all levels of explicitness, evaluative processing is shaped by external input 
and inner motivational states. Evaluative judgments measured with self-report 
questionnaires are assumed to reflect high levels of elaboration about the persuasive setting. 
Moreover, processing of information can be either broad or narrow; we assume that 
minority cues trigger divergent processing of information at all levels of explicitness. These 
assumptions by the ASCI model will be outlined and illustrated in the following sections. 
4.1 Implicit minority and majority influence 
Implicit measures of attitudes provide the possibility to tap (more or less) into effortless, dif-
ficult-to-control or automatic manifestations of attitude change (e.g. Moors & DeHouwer, 
2006). So far, implicit reaction-time based measures of attitudes have been applied only in 
very few studies on minority and majority influence. Extending on mere consensus studies 
(Erb et al., 1998), we added an implicit measure of the target attitude to investigate whether 
minority or majority persuasion would emerge at an automatic level (Dickel, 2011). Either a 
minority of 14% or a majority of 86% recommended a fictitious holiday area (the 'Curutao 
Lake') quoting several arguments of mixed strength (see Erb et al., 2005). Later, participants 
engaged in an evaluative priming task, where they categorized target words via left-hand 
and right-hand key-presses according to their valence. Target words were preceded either 
by the standard primes 'rain' or 'sun', or by the name of the recommended holiday region 
'Curutao'. Interestingly, although explicit attitudes were more positive in the majority 
condition (compared to the minority condition), the implicit measure of the target attitude 
was not affected by source status. That is, the 'Curutao' prime did not facilitate responses to 
positive target words or negative target words in either condition. Yet, automatic evaluation 
of standard evaluative primes ('rain' versus 'sun') was reversed in the minority condition, 
i.e. participants that had read the minority position on the lake, responded faster to positive 
targets that were preceded by the 'rain' prime, indicating, that they evaluated 'rain' 
positively, whereas 'sun' was automatically evaluated negatively. Following majority 
communication, the usual evaluation of sun and rain was found at an automatic level. This 
pattern was interpreted as divergent processing at an automatic level (see also Nemeth, 
1986) which could be grounded in a creative mindset (see Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000) 
activated by minority cues. To corroborate our view, further studies have to be conducted. 
To assess automatic evaluation of minorities and majorities per se, Mucchi-Faina, Pacilli, 
and Pagliaro (2011) had participants complete an implicit measure of attitudes. In a lexical 
decision task participants decided via key-presses if a letter string was a word or not. Letter 
strings were preceded by very short (15ms) masked presentation of the labels "minority" 
and "majority". Response to positive words was facilitated by majority primes, whereas 
minority primes did not affect target classification. The results indicate a positive 
connotation of the word "majority", whereas the word "minority" is not unitarily evaluated. 
On the basis of these preliminary results from implicit measures and recent theorizing on at-
titude change, we propose a theoretical reframing of studies that showed an increased im-
pact of consensus information under conditions of low processing effort. Traditionally, such 
results have been interpreted in terms of heuristic processing. For instance, when argument 
quality is not considered by participants, indicating that elaboration effort was low, con-
sensus information becomes more predictive of thought valence and evaluative judgments 
(e.g. Erb et al., 1998). The application of heuristics like "majorities usually hold correct 
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opinions" would require active thought or – in terms of the APE model – propositional 
thinking. However, increased impact of minority versus majority status when processing 
effort is low could also be explained by assuming (partial) implicit or automatic processing 
and evaluation of consensus information. The positive automatic reaction to the majority 
would then mediate the positive attitude toward the persuasive topic. 
Moreover, recent studies (Bohner, et al., 2008; Erb, et al., 2009; Imhoff & Erb, 2009) found 
low effort influence by minorities and majorities on attitudes that was affected by context in-
formation or current motives of the perceiver. For example, when participants' need for 
uniqueness (Snyder & Fromkin, 1977) was high, participants judged minority positions to be 
more and majority positions to be less attractive even when there were no explicit argu-
ments (Imhoff & Erb, 2009, exp. 1). Here, in our view, the current motivational state shaped 
processing of consensus information to serve the need for uniqueness – even at an automatic 
level. As being affiliated with minority sources provides the possibility to enhance one's 
own unusualness, minority stimuli were automatically evaluated more positively. Finally, 
the evaluative judgment was based on this positive automatic evaluation of consensus (see 
APE, case 1). In another study, minority positions were more attractive when participants 
had been subtly primed with risk-related concepts (Erb et al., 2009). As statements endorsed 
by minorities are more risky in the sense that they are not as socially approved as majority 
positions, participants can gain the valuable position of being one of the few 'clever ones' 
who were correct – but this outcome is fraught with uncertainty. Consequently, minority 
positions should be more attractive when people are in a "risky" mindset (Erb et al., 2009). 
Because participants were not aware of the risk-priming, it is plausible to assume that the 
priming shifted the automatic evaluation of consensus information. The explicit measures 
employed in the research just described do not speak to the potential impact of automatic 
evaluations, but, they may well reflect a blend of automatic and heuristic processing. 
In the following sections we will take a closer look at how implicit evaluations of consensus 
information are formed and changed and how they can impact on more explicit evaluative 
judgments. Building on the APE model, we assume that the pattern of spontaneous activa-
tion of concepts (see e.g. Smith, 1996) related to consensus and the persuasive topic is 
shaped by contextual input and internal motivational states. Which aspects are activated de-
pends on the current accessibility of concepts, which in turn depends on the context of 
presentation and on motivational or emotional states within the perceiver. Applied to 
minority and majority influence, context will render specific aspects of consensus 
information (or parts of information from the arguments) more accessible. For example, in 
the context of elections large majorities of more than 90% would likely be associated with 
cheating, whereas in online customer evaluations a consensus of 99% is quite usual and 
associated positively. In a study that investigated the effects of large minorities and small 
majorities – at least outside the context of elections – Erb, et al. (2006) found increased 
minority influence and decreased majority influence when explicit consensus information 
was larger for minorities (e.g., 48%) and smaller for majorities (e.g., 52%) than the consensus 
inferred in conditions where no explicit percentages were provided.  
Presumably even more powerful than contextual input, internal motivational states can also 
shift automatic activation of associations (Ferguson & Bargh, 2004). Aspects that are func-
tional to reach current goals will be highly accessible. For example, when a person's need to 
be unique is high (Fromkin & Snyder, 1977), associations toward minority cues such as 
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“special” or “rare” might be rendered more accessible because they are goal relevant in the 
sense that being associated with a minority makes a person more unique (Imhoff & Erb, 
2009). Hence, high accessibility of positive aspects related to minorities will result in a more 
positive implicit attitude toward them. In the same vein, when people are highly accuracy 
motivated, associations between high consensus and correctness (Bohner et al., 2008; 
Mackie, 1987) will become more accessible and lead to a positive implicit attitude toward 
majorities.  
To organize the motivational impact on automatic activation of associations toward minorit-
ies and majorities we will adopt a catalogue of goals by Cialdini and Goldstein (2004): accur-
acy in ones judgments, affiliation to others, and maintaining a positive self-concept. When 
motivation to hold accurate attitudes is high, presumably valid and important information 
in the persuasive setting is functional to reach the goal, thus, corresponding concepts are ac-
tivated (e.g. majorities = correct; scientific study = approved). High motivation to affiliate 
with others will highlight socially relevant aspects that help to reach the goal of affiliation. 
For example, the aspect that majorities comprise a large source of support might be 
activated automatically. Ingroups should be evaluated even more positively under high 
affiliation motivation. When the motivation to maintain a positive self-concept is dominant, 
aspects that support own held beliefs will be more accessible. 
Research from the domain of stereotype reduction (Sassenberg & Moskowitz, 2005) suggests 
that automatic perception of minority and majority cues might not only impact accessibility 
of concepts related to consensus information, but could also be capable to affect the way in 
which information is processed (Nemeth, 1986) – even at an automatic level. A creative 
(versus thoughtful) mindset was activated when participants described three instances 
where they had been creative (versus thoughtful). Subsequently, a lexical decision task with 
facial primes of African and European Americans was completed to reveal racial stereotypes 
of African Americans. Stereotype activation was significantly reduced for participants in a 
creative mindset (Sassenberg & Moskowitz, 2005). Relating this to our finding, discussed 
above, that the automatic evaluation of standard words was reversed following minority 
communication (Dickel, 2011), we assume that considering minority arguments might result 
in divergent processing that operates at a non-conscious level.  
In sum, we argue that automatic associations of consensus cues affect the persuasive 
outcome – either at an implicit level or by indirectly affecting explicit evaluative judgments 
(Figure 1). How automatic associations can affect explicit judgments will be outlined next. 
4.2 Explicit minority and majority influence 
We assume that more systematic processing minority and majority communication can be 
measured with explicit self reports – like propositional processes in the APE model and sys-
tematic processing in the HSM. In line with the APE model we assume that the most com-
mon case of propositional thinking is approval of the automatic affective reaction. When 
motivation and opportunity are sufficiently high to elaborate further, automatic evaluations 
are compared with inferences about the information. For example, the association “majority 
= correct = positive” could be questioned when propositions like "majorities also supported 
genocides" come into play. Such a consideration would create cognitive inconsistency 
(Festinger, 1957), which could be reconciled by rejecting the association on the basis of 
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strong arguments. The amount of propositions that are taken into account is affected by the 
amount of time new propositions are considered, which in turn can depend on (a) current 
processing goals that define whether the actual level of confidence in the judgment is 
sufficient or not (Bohner et al., 1995), (b) context effects, e.g. how clearly the information is 
presented, and (c) available processing capacity. Hence, changes in the considered set of 
propositions result in changes in explicit evaluative judgments. The content of propositions 
can – like automatic associations – depend on processing goals and context of presentation. 
For example, when accuracy motivation is high, the automatic reaction to the majority label 
could be positive (see above). Because accuracy-motivated individuals are likely to consider 
a large range of propositions, they might bring to mind instances where the majority heur-
istic was misleading. When arguments are strong, this might attenuate the heuristic value of 
consensus information for accuracy-motivated individuals (see attenuation hypothesis 
Bohner et al., 1995) – resulting in rejection of the automatic affective reaction – and guide 
their attention toward other information in the persuasive setting. Thus, when processed 
with the goal of accuracy, attitudes should be determined by argument quality. However, 
when arguments are ambiguous, participants with high accuracy motivation presumably ac-
cepted the positive automatic reaction toward the majority as a valid source for correct atti-
tudes (Bohner et al., 2008, accuracy conditions), and moderately agreed with the majority. 
Importantly, if the goal to affiliate or to maintain a positive self-concept is active, the set of 
considered propositions may differ according to their relevance for the current motive.  
The motive to affiliate with others, too, will affect the considered set of propositions that are 
aggregated in an evaluative judgment or explicit attitude. In general, individuals will strive 
to identify and adopt attitudes and arguments that are socially accepted. Participants with a 
highly activated affiliation motive (Bohner et al., 2008, affiliation conditions) accepted the 
majority's position – irrespective of argument quality. In our terms, they presumably based 
their judgment predominantly on the positive automatic evaluation of the majority cue as a 
large source of social support. As motivation to discount majority arguments was presum-
ably low, search for more thoughts was ended relatively early, not bringing to mind conflict-
ing propositions. In contrast, minority positions were scrutinized for valid arguments. As 
being associated with a minority is usually seen as opposed to the goal to affiliate (see 
Mugny, 1982), minority arguments have to be really convincing to be adopted. 
A study by Erb et al. (2002) illustrates how the need for a positive self-concept can shape 
propositional processes in minority and majority influence. The authors found more 
systematic processing of majority messages than minority messages when participants' prior 
attitudes were moderate; however, when participants' prior attitudes were opposed to the 
message's position, minority messages were considered more extensively than majority 
messages. When prior attitudes oppose persuasive arguments, the motivation to maintain a 
positive self and to reject the arguments is likely to be high. Thus, as it serves the current 
motivational state, participants will consider a selection of propositions that can easily be 
discounted and dismissed – resulting in regained consistency between considered thoughts. 
Here, consensus information can corroborate inferences that the information given is inval-
id. The aspect of minorities' being deviant and incorrect is highlighted. Consequently, 
searching for the flaws in minorities' argumentation may appear more fruitful than scrutin-
izing majorities' messages – higher levels of systematic thinking are thus more likely for op-
posing minority views (Erb et al., 2002, p. 1180). However, when arguments are strong, and 
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thus validated to be correct, the proposition that the minority is probably incorrect has to be 
rejected, to re-establish consistency among propositions. Moreover, an additional 
proposition might be generated like 'a correct minority is brighter than the majority and 
brave', which should contribute to the positive evaluation of strong arguments. On the other 
hand, when arguments are weak, source status implies a simple new proposition that can 
resolve inconsistency between recipients' own attitudes and views communicated by 
minorities: Arguments dysfunctional to maintain a positive self-concept can be rejected on 
the basis that the source is probably incorrect anyway.  
Attitude change through effortful thinking following minority and majority communication 
emerges not only via consideration of different sets of thoughts and motivated rejection of 
certain parts of the active set of thoughts, it can also be due to changes in the strategy to re-
concile contradicting propositions into a consistent judgment (see Gawronski & Boden-
hausen, 2006a, p. 701). For instance, by giving example to solve tasks in an unconventional 
manner, minority sources will highlight the possibility to think outside the box. Although 
this point should generally transfer to majorities, minorities seem to trigger a processing 
style that may be characterized as creative or divergent (see above). Thus, contradicting 
propositions may be more easily reconciled when a person is thinking in a more creative or 
open way (for theoretical frameworks of processing styles see e.g. Förster & Dannenberg, 
2010). Thinking more creatively may well be grounded in automatic processes. On the basis 
of automatic divergent associations (Dickel, 2011; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Sassenberg 
& Moskowitz, 2005) creative thoughts might be more accessible. Also, if group status is 
manipulated between participants, the existence of more than one alternative group beside a 
minority could be inferred by the participants, setting a higher norm of general divergence. 
This reasoning is less likely for (large) majorities (see also Naumer, 1996). Strategies to 
reconcile contradicting propositions can, again, be shaped by motives and context. 
How automatic associations can affect explicit judgments beyond mere approval or disap-
proval of their evaluative implications will be considered in our assumptions on the inter-
play of automatic and systematic processing of minority or majority communication. 
4.3 Interplay of automatic and systematic processing in minority and majority  
influence 
From the perspective of the APE-model changes in associative structure and/or pattern ac-
tivation can influence propositional thinking when the automatic association is considered a 
valid or invalid basis to form an evaluative summary (case 1). Conversely, change in 
propositions can mediate associative processes by bringing propositions to mind that activate 
automatic associative reactions (case 4). These cases appear to be conceptualized in the APE 
model as additive influences with varying weights on associations and propositions. For 
example, in the evaluative conditioning study described above (Field, 2006), where children 
liked cartoon characters more after they had been presented together with ice-cream (than 
with Brussels sprouts), the APE model would assume a change in associative structure of the 
character's representation. Corresponding change on explicit measures would be due to the 
approval of the associative implication (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006a). 
By contrast, we assume that automatic associations can trigger assimilating and contrasting 
biases in propositional thinking. Consensus information and dominant features of the mes-
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sage will automatically activate certain aspects of the concepts. Which aspects will be activ-
ated depends on the context of presentation and on the perceiver's motivational state. For 
example, a majority cue could activate the concept 'correct' or 'safe' when an accuracy goal 
prevails. Based on these active concepts effortful thinking will bring to mind inferences 
about source implications and the topic. Thus, once a majority cue has been evaluated posit-
ively (e.g. due to the perceiver's motivational state), the perceiver will be more likely to gen-
erate thoughts that will support the majority's arguments. Hence, the valence of thoughts 
will be assimilated to the initial automatic affective reaction. We assume that an assimilating 
bias in effortful thinking will occur only when message arguments are open to 
interpretation to some extent. If, however, message arguments violate the implications of 
initial associative reactions to the source, these initial reactions will be actively rejected, and 
the result will be a contrasting bias in effortful thinking (see Bohner et al., 2008).  
4.4 New predictions  
Implicit attitudes toward consensus information and toward the message topic change ac-
cording to motivational states and context factors. When accuracy motivation prevails, high 
consensus usually activates positive (goal-serving) associations of correctness, whereas low 
consensus activates negative associations of incorrectness. When affiliation motivation pre-
vails, minority and majority stimuli will activate different aspects of the concept: Belonging 
to a majority will usually satisfy the need to be connected more effectively than being associ-
ated with a minority. When the motivation to maintain a positive self-concept prevails, con-
sensus information can be functional to discount or corroborate a perceiver's own views, 
which will trigger appropriate automatic associations. Depending on the information given 
in the context, different associations can be activated.  
Explicit attitudes toward consensus information and toward the message topic also change 
according to motivational states and context factors. When accuracy motivation prevails, 
evaluative judgments will usually be based on argument quality. When arguments are un-
clear, however, individuals can rely on consensus information as indicating the level of 
support for the message position. Thus, arguments will be assimilated to (automatic) source 
evaluation. If arguments clearly violate such initial evaluations, more effortful judgments of 
the issue will be contrasted to them. Correlations between implicit and explicit change will 
increase when assimilating bias occurs, and decrease when contrasting bias occurs. When af-
filiation motivation prevails, perceivers will bring to mind or highlight thoughts that are 
functional for social affiliation. When the motivation to maintain a positive self-concept pre-
vails, consensus information can be functional to discount or corroborate the perceiver's 
own views, which will trigger appropriate thoughts. Depending on the information given in 
the context, different thoughts will be brought to mind. 
The amount of listed thoughts is a function of motivation strength and opportunity to pro-
cess the information of interest. The larger the gap between perceivers' actual and desired 
confidence in their own judgment, the greater will be the perceivers' effort to scrutinize giv-
en information and to generate thoughts (see sufficiency threshold, e.g. Bohner et al., 1995).  
The content of both thought listings and automatic associations is influenced by more diver-
gent processing following minority than majority communication. Whether this is due to 
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different levels of arousal or the activation of different mindsets should be investigated fur-
ther. Instruments that assess the novelty of concepts (Vinokur & Burnstein, 1974) or self-gen-
erated arguments (Bohner & Schwarz, 1993) can be applied to address this question. 
4.5 Discussion 
We acknowledge that, to date, much of our analysis is speculative and many of our conclu-
sions are based on plausible inferences rather than on empirical findings. Thus, the predic-
tions outlined above have to undergo extensive testing. However, we hope to have demon-
strated the exciting opportunities of integrating theorizing on automatic associations into 
the study of minority and majority influence. 
Going beyond the APE model and the HSM, we have outlined in detail how automatic asso-
ciations may bias systematic thinking. This is specified for the case of consensus effects on 
persuasion. Although the APE model mentions that motivational states affect propositional 
thinking (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006a, p. 711) and automatic associations (p. 700), 
they do not explain in detail how motivational states affect attitude change. We assume that 
motivational states affect both implicit and explicit attitudes by making goal appropriate as-
sociations and/or propositions more accessible. Moreover, we allow for and predict assimil-
ating and contrasting bias in the interplay of automatic and systematic processing. 
Different from the APE model and the HSM, we do not assume two distinct processes but 
rather a continuum of implicitness versus explicitness in the processing of consensus and 
message information.  
5. Conclusion 
In conclusion, we argue that – as persuasion research has cross-fertilized research on minor-
ity and majority influence – new methodological and theoretical paradigms in attitude re-
search have the potential to generate new insights into minority and majority influence pro-
cesses. Applying implicit measures of attitude to majority and minority influence can en-
hance our understanding of which cognitive processes are affected by consensus informa-
tion. In particular, the use of response-time based paradigms may enhance our understand-
ing of the extent to which consensus information and messages aspects may be processed 
automatically. The assumption of a continuum of explicitness may help us to generate and 
test new hypotheses about consensus effects. More generally, the concept of gradually 
changing explicitness of evaluations (instead of dichotomous implicit versus explicit 
evaluations) could provide a noteworthy extension for attitude change theories. 
6. References  
Abrams, D., Wetherell, M., Cochrane, S., Hogg, M. A., & Turner, J. C. (1990). Knowing what to 
think by knowing who you are: Self-categorization and the nature of norm formation, 
conformity and group polarization. British Journal of Social Psychology, 29, 97–119. 
Alvaro, E. M. & Crano, W. D. (1997). Indirect minority influence: Evidence for leniency in 
source evaluation and counterargumentation. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 72, 949–964. 
www.intechopen.com
 
Psychology – Selected Papers 
 
270 
Allport, G. W. (1935). Attitudes. In C. Murchinson (Ed.), A Handbook of Social Psychology (pp. 
798–844). Worcester, MA, US: Clark University Press. 
Asch, S. E. (1952). Social Psychology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, US: Prentice Hall. 
Asch, S. E. (1956). Studies of independence and submission to group pressure: I. A minority of 
one against a unanimous majority. Psychological Monographs, 70(9, Whole No. 417). 
Baker, S. M., & Petty, R. E. (1994). Majority and minority influence: Source-position imbal-
ance as a determinant of message scrutiny. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 67, 5–19. 
Barden, J., Maddux, W. W., Petty, R. E., & Brewer,M. B. (2004). Contextual moderation of ra-
cial bias: The impact of social roles on controlled and automatically activated atti-
tudes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 5–22. 
Bargh, J. A. (2007). Social psychology and the unconscious: The automaticity of higher men-
tal processes. New York, NY, US: Psychology Press.  
Bem, D. J. (1972). Self-perception theory. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 6, 1–62. 
Bond, R. & Smith, P. B. (1996). Culture and conformity: A meta-analysis of studies using 
Asch’s (1952b, 1956) line judgment task. Psychological Bulletin, 119, 111–137. 
Bohner, G., & Dickel, N. (2011). Attitudes and attitude change. Annual Review of Psychology, 
62. 391–417. 
Bohner, G., Dykema-Engblade, A., Tindale, R. S., & Meisenhelder, H. (2008). Framing of 
minority and majority source information in persuasion: When and how "con-
sensus implies correctness". Social Psychology, 108–116. 
Bohner, G., Erb, H.-P., Reinhard, M.-A., & Frank, E. (1996). Distinctiveness across topics in 
minority and majority influence: An attributional analysis and preliminary data. 
British Journal of Social Psychology, 35, 27–46. 
Bohner, G., Frank, E., & Erb, H.-P. (1998). Heuristic processing of distinctiveness information 
in minority and majority influence. European Journal of Social Psychology, 5, 855–860.  
Bohner, G., Moskowitz, G. B., & Chaiken, S. (1995). The interplay of heuristic and systematic 
processing of social information. European Review of Social Psychology, 6, 33–68. 
Bohner G., Ruder,M., & Erb, H.-P. (2002). When expertise backfires: Contrast and assimila-
tion effects in persuasion. British Journal of Social Psychology, 41, 495–519. 
Bohner, G., & Schwarz, N. (1993). Mood states influence the production of persuasive argu-
ments. Communication Research, 20, 696–722. 
Chaiken, S. (1987). The heuristic model of persuasion. In M. P. Zanna, J. M. Olson, & C. P. 
Herman (Eds.), Social Influence: The Ontario Symposium (Vol. 5, pp. 3–39). Hillsdale, 
NJ: Erlbaum. 
Chaiken, S., Liberman, A., & Eagly, A. H. (1989). Heuristic and systematic information pro-
cessing within and beyond the persuasion context. In J. S. Uleman & J. A. Bargh 
(Eds.), Unintended thought pp. 212–252). New York: Guilford.  
Chaiken, S., & Maheswaran, D. (1994). Heuristic processing can bias systematic processing: 
Effects of source credibility, argument ambiguity, and task importance on attitude 
judgment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 460–473. 
Conrey, F. R., Sherman, J.W., Gawronski, B., Hugenberg, K., & Groom, C.J. (2005). 
Separating multiple processes in implicit social cognition: the quad model of 
implicit task performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89, 469–487. 
Conrey, F. R., & Smith, E. R. (2007). Attitude representation: attitudes as patterns in a 
distributed, connectionist representational system. Social Cognition, 25, 718–735 
Cialdini, R. B., & Goldstein, N. J. (2004). Social Influence: Compliance and Conformity. In S. 
T. Fiske, D. L. Schacter, & C. Zahn-Waxler (Eds.), Annual Review of Psychology 
(Vol. 55). Annual Reviews, Inc., pp. 591-621. 
www.intechopen.com
 
Minority and Majority Influence on Attitudes 
 
271 
Cialdini, R.B., & Trost, M.R. (1998). Social influence: Social norms, conformity, and 
compliance. In D. Gilbert, S. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.) The handbook of social 
psychology, (4th edition) vol. 2, pp. 151-192. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Crano, W. D., & Alvaro, E. M. (1998). The context/comparison model of social influence: 
Mechanisms, structure, and linkages that underlie indirect attitude change. In W. 
Stroebe & M. Hewstone (Eds.), European Review of Social Psychology (Vol. 8, pp. 175–
202). Chinchester, UK: Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
Crano, W.D., & Hannula-Bral, K.A. (1994). Context/categorization model of social influence: 
Minority and majority influence in the formation of a novel response norm. Journal 
of Experimental Social Psychology, 30, 247–276. 
Crutchfield, R. S. (1955). Conformity and character. American Psychologist, 10, 191–198. 
David, B., & Turner, J. C. (1999). Studies in self-categorization and minority conversion: The 
ingroup minority in intragroup and intergroup contexts. British Journal of Social 
Psychology, 38, 115–134. 
De Houwer, J. (2009). The propositional approach to associative learning as an alternative 
for association formation models. Learning & Behavior, 37, 1–20.  
De Houwer, J., Teige-Mocigemba, S., Spruyt, A., & Moors, A. (2009). Implicit measures: a 
normative analysis and review. Psychological Bulletin, 135, 347–368 
Dickel, N. (2011). Implicit minority and majority influence. Talk presented at the Transfer of 
Knowledge Conference, ESCON2, at Sligo, Ireland, 24.–28. Aug. 2011. 
Doms, M. & van Avermaet, E. (1980). Majority influence, minority influence and conversion 
behavior: a replication. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 16, 283–292.  
Erb, H.-P. & Bohner, G. (2001). Mere consensus effects in minority and majority influence. 
In: C. K. W. De Dreu & N. K. De Vries (Eds.), Group consensus and minority influence: 
Implications for innovation (pp.40–59). Oxford, UK: Blackwell publishers. 
Erb, H.-P., & Bohner, G. (2010). Consensus as the key: Towards parsimony in explaining 
minority and majority influence. In R. Martin & M. Hewstone (Eds.), Minority in-
fluence and innovation: Antecedents, processes and consequences (pp. 79–103). Hove, 
UK: Psychology Press. 
Erb, H.-P., Bohner, G., Hewstone, M., Wert, L., & Reinhard, M.-A. (2006). Large minorities 
and small majorities: Interactive effects of inferred and explicit consensus on atti-
tudes. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 28, 221–231. 
Erb, H.-P., Bohner, G., Schmälzle, K. & Rank, S. (1998). Beyond conflict and discrepancy. Per-
sonality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24, 620–633. 
Erb, H.-P., Bohner, G., Rank, S., & Einwiller, S. (2002) role of prior attitudes  
Erb, H.-P., Büscher, M., Bohner, G., & Rank, S. (2005). Starke und schwache Argumente als 
Teile derselben Botschaft: Die "Mixed-Message Methode" zur Erfassung des kogni-
tiven Aufwands bei der Verarbeitung persuasiver Kommunikation. Zeitschrift für 
Sozialpsychologie, 36, 61–75. 
Erb, H.-P., Hilton, D. J., Bohner, G., & Krings, L. (2009). The minority position – A risk-seek-
ing choice. unpublished manuscript. 
Erb, H.-P., Pierro, A., Mannetti, L., Spiegel, S., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2007). Biased processing 
of persuasive information: on the functional equivalence of cues and message 
arguments. European Journal of Social Psychology, 37, 1057–1075. 
Fazio, R. H. (2007). Attitudes as object-evaluation associations of varying strength. Social 
Cognition, 25, 603–637. 
Fazio, R. H., Jackson , J. R., Dunton, B. C., & Williams, C. J. (1995). Variability in automatic 
activation as an unobtrusive measure of racial attitudes: a bona fide pipeline? 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 1013–1027. 
www.intechopen.com
 
Psychology – Selected Papers 
 
272 
Ferguson, M. J., & Bargh, J. A. (2004). Liking is for doing: The effects of goal pursuit on 
automatic evaluation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 557–572. 
Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Evanston, IL: Row Peterson. 
Festinger, L., & Carlsmith, J. M. (1959). Cognitive consequences of forced compliance. 
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 58, 203–210. 
Field, A. P. (2005). Is the meta-analysis of correlation coefficients accurate when population 
effect sizes vary? Psychological Methods, 10 (4), 444–467.  
Fiske, S. T. and Taylor, S. E. (1991). Social cognition (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw Hill. 
Foroni, F., & Mayr, U. (2005). The power of a story: New, automatic associations from a 
single reading of a short scenario. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 12, 139–144. 
Förster, J. & Dannenberg, L. (2010). GLOMO sys : A Systems Account of Global versus Local 
Processing. Psychological Inquiry, target article, 21, 175–197.  
Friese, M., Hofmann, W., & Wänke, M. (2008). When impulses take over: Moderated predict-
ive validity of explicit and implicit attitude measures in predicting food choice and 
consumption behaviour. British Journal of Social Psychology, 47, 397–419.  
Galinsky, A. D. & Moskowitz, G. B. (2002). Counterfactuals as behavioral primes: Priming 
the simulation heuristic and consideration of alternatives. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 36, 384–409. 
Gawronski, B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2006a). Associative and propositional processes in 
evaluation: An integrative review of implicit and explicit attitude change. Psycho-
logical Bulletin, 132, 692–731.  
Gawronski, B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2006b). Associative and propositional processes in 
evaluation: Conceptual, empirical, and meta-theoretical issues. Reply to Albarracín, 
Hart, and McCulloch (2006), Kruglanski and Dechesne (2006), and Petty and Briñol 
(2006). Psychological Bulletin, 132, 745–750.  
Gawronski, B., & Payne, B. K. (Eds.). (2010). Handbook of implicit social cognition: Measurement, 
theory, and applications. New York: Guilford Press.  
Gilbert, D. T., & Hixon, J. G. (1991). The trouble of thinking: Activation and application of 
stereotypic beliefs. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 509–517. 
Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. K. L. (1998). Measuring individual 
differences in implicit cognition: The Implicit Association Test. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 74, 1464–1480. 
Hodges, B. H., & Geyer, A. (2006). A nonconformist account of the Asch experiments: Values, 
pragmatics, and moral dilemmas. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10, 2–19.  
Hofmann, W., Friese, M., & Strack, F. (2009). Impulse and self-control from a dual-systems 
perspective. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 4, 162–176.  
Hofmann, W., Gawronski, B., Gschwendner, T., Le, H., & Schmitt, M. (2005). A meta-
analysis on the correlation between the Implicit Association Test and explicit self-
report measures. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 1369–1385.  
Imhoff, R., & Erb, H.-P. (2009). What motivates nonconformity? Uniqueness seeking blocks 
majority influence. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 35, 309–320. 
Jones, E., & Sigall, H. (1971). The Bogus Pipeline: A new paradigm for measuring affect and 
attitude. Psychological Bulletin, 76, 349–364.  
Kelley, H. H. (1967). Attribution theory in social psychology. In D. Levine (Ed.), Nebraska 
symposium on motivation (pp. 192–238), Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 
Kelley, H. H. (1973). The process of causal attribution. American Psychologist, 28, 107–128.  
Kruglanski, A. W., & Dechesne, M. (2006). Are associative and propositional processes qual-
itatively distinct? Comment on Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006). Psychological 
Bulletin, 132, 736–739. 
www.intechopen.com
 
Minority and Majority Influence on Attitudes 
 
273 
Kruglanski, A. W. & Mackie, D. M. (1990). Majority and minority influence: A judgmental 
process analysis. In: W. Stroebe & M. Hewstone (Eds.), European Review of Social 
Psychology (pp. 229–161). Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
Kruglanski, A.W. & Thompson, E.P. (1999). Persuasion by a single route: A view from the 
unimodel. Psychological Inquiry, 10, 83–109. 
Latané, B., & L' Herrou, T. (1996). Spatial clustering in the conformity game: Dynamic social 
impact in electronic games. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 1218–
1230.  
Latané, B. & Wolf, S. (1981). The social impact of majorities and minorities. Psychological 
Review, 88, 438–453.  
Likert, R. (1932). A Technique for the Measurement of Attitudes. Archives of Psychology, 140, 
1–55.  
Maass, A., & Clark, R. D. III (1983). Internalization versus compliance: Differential processes 
underlying minority influence and conformity. European Journal of Social Psychology, 
13, 197–215.  
Maass, A., & Clark, R. D. III (1984). Hidden impact of minorities: Fifteen years of minority 
influence research. Psychological Bulletin, 95, 428–450. 
Mackie, D. M. (1987). Systematic and nonsystematic processing of majority and minority 
persuasive communications. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 41–52.  
Martin, R., & Hewstone, M. (2001). Afterthoughts on after-images: A review of the literature 
using the afterimage paradigm in majority and minority influence. In C. De Drew 
& N. De Vires (Eds.), Group innovation: Fundamental and applied perspectives (pp. 15–
39). Oxford: Blackwell.  
Milgram, S., Bickman, L., Berkowitz, L. (1969). Note on the drawing power of crowds of dif-
ferent size. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 13, 79–2.  
Miller, N., & Pederson, W. C. (1999). Assessing process distinctiveness. Psychological Inquiry, 
10, 150–156. 
Mitchell, C. J., De Houwer, J., & Lovibond, P. F. (2009). The propositional nature of human 
associative learning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32, 183–198. 
Monroe, B. M., & Read, S. J. (2008). A general connectionist model of attitude structure and 
change: The ACS (Attitudes as Constraint Satisfaction) model. Psychological Review, 
115, 733–759.  
Moors, A., & De Houwer, J. (2006). Automaticity: theoretical and conceptual analysis. Psy-
chological Bulletin, 132, 297–326. 
Moscovici, S. (1980). Toward a theory of conversion behavior. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances 
in experimental social psychology (Vol. 13, pp. 209–239). New York: Academic Press. 
Moscovici, S., Lage, E., & Naffrechoux , M. (1969). Influence of a consistent minority on the 
response of a majority in a color perception task. Sociometry, 32, 365–380.  
Moscovici, S. & Personnaz, B. (1980). Studies on social influence V. Minority influence and 
conversion behavior in a perceptual task. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 
16, 270–282. 
Mucchi-Faina, A., Pacilli, M. G., & Pagliaro, S. (2011). Automatic reactions to the labels 
“minority” and “majority” are asymmetrical: Implications for minority and 
majority influence. Social Influence, 6, 181–196. 
Mugny, G. (1982). The power of minorities. London: Academic Press. 
Naumer, B. (1996). Auswirkungen wahrgenommener Festgelegtheit eines Entscheidungs-
prozesses auf die Diverenz des Denkens [How perceived determination of decisi-
ons affects divergent thinking]. Unpublished manuscript.  
www.intechopen.com
 
Psychology – Selected Papers 
 
274 
Nemeth, C. J. (1986). Differential contributions of majority and minority influence. Psycholo-
gical Review, 93, 23–32. 
Nemeth, C., & Kwan, J. (1985). Originality of word associations as a function of majority vs. 
minority influence. Social Psychology Quarterly, 48, 277–282. 
Nemeth, C., Mayseless, O., Sherman, J., & Brown, Y. (1990). Exposure to dissent and recall of 
information. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58, 429–437. 
Nemeth, C., & Wachtler, J. (1983). Creative problem solving as a result of majority vs 
minority influence. European Journal of Social Psychology, 13, 45–55. 
Petty, R.E., Briñol, P., & DeMarree, K.G. (2007). The Meta-Cognitive Model (MCM) of 
attitudes: Implications for attitude measurement, change, and strength. Social 
Cognition, 25(5), 657–686. 
Petty, R. E. & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion. In L. 
Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 19, pp. 123–205), 
New York: Academic Press.  
Petty, R. E., Haugtvedt, C. P., & Smith, S. M. (1995). Message elaboration as a determinant of 
attitude strength. In R. E. Petty & J. A. Krosnick (Eds.), Attitude strength: Ante-
cedents and consequences. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.  
Petty, R. E., & Wegener, D. T. (1998). Attitude change: Multiple roles for persuasion 
variables. In D. Gilbert, S. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), The handbook of social 
psychology (4th ed., pp. 323–390). New York: McGraw-Hill.  
Rothermund, K., & Wentura, D. (2004). Underlying processes in the Implicit Association 
Test: Dissociating salience from associations. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 133, 139–165.  
Sassenberg, K. & Moskowitz, G. B. (2005). Don't stereotype, think different! Overcoming 
automatic stereotype activation by mindset priming. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 41, 506–514. 
Schwarz, N., & Bohner, G. (2001). The construction of attitudes. In A. Tesser & N. Schwarz 
(Eds.), Blackwell handbook of social psychology, Vol. 1: Intraindividual processes 
(pp. 436–457). Oxford, UK: Blackwell. 
Smith, E. R. (1996). What do connectionism and social psychology offer each other? Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology , 70, 893–912.  
Snyder, C. R., & Fromkin, H. L. (1977). Abnormality as a positive characteristic: The 
development and validation of a scale measuring need for uniqueness. Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology, 86, 518–527. 
Strack, F., & Deutsch, R. (2004). Reflective and impulsive determinants of social behavior. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3, 220–247.  
Thoben, D. F. & Erb, H.-P. (2010). Wie es euch gefällt: Sozialer Einfluss durch Mehrheiten 
und Minderheiten. In-Mind Magazine, 1(2).  
Tanford, S. E. & Penrod, S. (1984). Social influence model: A formal integration of research 
on majority and minority influence processes. Psychological Bulletin, 95, 189–225.  
Vinokur, A., & Burnstein, E. (1974). Effects of partially shared persuasive arguments on 
group-induced shifts: A group-problem-solving approach. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 29(3), 305–315.  
Wood, W., Lundgren, S., Oullette, J. A., Busceme, S., & Blackstone, T. (1994). A meta-analytic 
review of social influence processes. Psychological Bulletin, 115, 323–345. 
www.intechopen.com
Psychology - Selected Papers
Edited by Dr. Gina Rossi
ISBN 978-953-51-0587-9
Hard cover, 330 pages
Publisher InTech
Published online 02, May, 2012
Published in print edition May, 2012
InTech Europe
University Campus STeP Ri 
Slavka Krautzeka 83/A 
51000 Rijeka, Croatia 
Phone: +385 (51) 770 447 
Fax: +385 (51) 686 166
www.intechopen.com
InTech China
Unit 405, Office Block, Hotel Equatorial Shanghai 
No.65, Yan An Road (West), Shanghai, 200040, China 
Phone: +86-21-62489820 
Fax: +86-21-62489821
This book represents a selection of chapters that address several topics from the broad domains of
psychology: alcoholism, clinical interventions, treatment of depression, personality psychology, qualitative
research methods in psychology, and social psychology. As such we have interesting blend of studies from
experts from a diverse array of psychology fields. The selected chapters will take the reader on an exciting
journey in the domains of psychology. We are sure the content will appeal to a great audience.
How to reference
In order to correctly reference this scholarly work, feel free to copy and paste the following:
Nina Dickel and Gerd Bohner (2012). Minority and Majority Influence on Attitudes, Psychology - Selected
Papers, Dr. Gina Rossi (Ed.), ISBN: 978-953-51-0587-9, InTech, Available from:
http://www.intechopen.com/books/psychology-selected-papers/minority-and-majority-influence-on-attitudes
© 2012 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This is an open access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0
License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
